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Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such 
punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial 
to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded 
that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These 
findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. 
However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human 
cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been 
sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here we 
first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences 
one’s reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future 
interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex 
strategies which use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or 
strategies which not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also 
towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly 
evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the 
evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future 
interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in 
humans should include reputation as an explicit feature. 
 
Keywords: game theory, punishment, cooperation, humans, experimental game 
 
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Cooperation is often enhanced if non-cooperators can be punished (Clutton-Brock & 
Parker 1995; Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Sigmund 2007; Raihani et al. 
2010), but this simple fact cannot yet explain the evolution of punishment, especially not 
if punishment inflicts immediate costs to the punisher. Indeed, in settings where 
individuals interact repeatedly with the same partner (Dreber et al. 2008; Rand et al. 
2009b; Wu et al. 2009), or when third-party punishment is possible (i.e. punishing players 
for being unkind to others (Ohtsuki et al. 2009; Ule et al. 2009)), punishers usually finish 
with lower payoffs than non-punishers (but see Raihani et al. 2010). It has therefore been 
concluded that punishment is mostly maladaptive within the respective games, and that it 
may have evolved for other reasons than for promoting cooperation (Dreber et al. 2008; 
Ohtsuki et al. 2009; Rand et al. 2009b; Ule t al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). However, the 
maladaptive argument is not very satisfying (Rankin et al. 2009) and, given the wide-
spread prevalence of punishment, a significant direct evolutionary advantage of 
punishment is still likely, for example, in the context of reputation games (Sigmund 
2007). 
Although it is well established that reputation can play a key role in social interactions 
(e.g. in the evolution of human cooperation - Alexander 1987; Zahavi 1991; Nowak & 
Sigmund 1998; Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2001; Milinski et al. 2002; 
Wedekind & Braithwaite 2002; Nowak & Sigmund 2005; Brandt & Sigmund 2006; 
Rankin & Eggimann 2009 ), the possible advantage from a reputation of being a punisher 
has not been sufficiently explored as an explanation for the evolution of punishment (if I 
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punish you because you have defected against me, others may later not defect against 
me). Some theoretical studies have suggested that, under certain circumstances, natural 
selection favours strategies that take the likelihood of being punished into account (Boyd 
& Richerson 1992; Gintis et al. 2001; Sigmund et al. 2001; Brandt et al. 2003; Gardner & 
West 2004; Hilbe & Sigmund In press), for example, when information about a 
neighbours’ behaviour is available (Brandt et al. 2003), or in situations where individuals 
cooperate according to the average punishment strategy played by all social partners 
(Gardner & West 2004). Thus, punishment could act as an indirect threat to observers. 
However, the majority of empirical studies so far have investigated punishment in 
anonymous settings where players did not have information on the others’ punitive 
behaviours, or in settings where this information was confounded with information about 
the others’ cooperative behaviours (Fehr & Gächter 2000; Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Rockenbach & Milinski 2006; Dreber et al. 2008; Gächter et al. 2008; Rand et al. 2009a; 
Ule et al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). 
Here, we explore the evolution of punishment in a helping game. In this game, a donor 
can either help, or refuse to help a receiver who then can punish in return (Gardner & 
West 2004; Lehmann et al. 2007; Hilbe & Sigmund In press). Such punitive actions 
influence an individual’s “punishment score”, which reflects how much an individual 
punished previously and can then be used by others to discriminate between punishers 
and non-punishers. Such a reputation system is analogous to the image scoring proposed 
for the evolution of indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Wedekind & Milinski 
2000; Leimar & Hammerstein 2001; Milinski et al. 2001; Wedekind & Braithwaite 2002; 
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Roberts 2008; Rankin & Eggimann 2009). In a simple analytical model, we investigate 
the evolutionary stability of a strategy that discriminates between punishers and non-
punishers. We then use computer simulations to extend our model and to test the 
robustness of the major outcome of the model. 
 
2. METHODS AND RESULTS 
(a) Analytical model 
We first build an analytical model. Individuals interact randomly and can choose to either 
help or not help their social partners. Defectors, who never help, are denoted by 
frequency xj, Cooperators, who always help, are denoted by frequency yj, and 
Discriminators, who only help individuals which punished in their last encounter, are 
denoted by frequency zj. The subscript j  {N, P} denotes whether individuals are 
punishers (j = P) who punish upon not receiving help, or non-punishers (j = N), who 
never punish. We assume a simple form of scoring, where players have either a positive 
punishment score, or a negative punishment score. The parameter qij (where i  {x, y, z} 
and j  {N, P}) is the probability that an individual punished in their last encounter (and 
therefore has a positive punishment score) while 1 - qij is the probability that an 
individual did not punish in their last encounter (and therefore has a negative punishment 
score). For non-punishers, this probability is always zero. For punishers, it is contingent 
on them having experienced defection in their last encounter. Following replicator 
dynamics, and assuming an infinite population, the probability that a given individual 
punished at time  + 1 can be calculated by the following recursion relations: 
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qxP( + 1) = xN + xP + (1 - qxP())(zN + zP) 
qyP( + 1) = xN + xP + (1 - qyP())(zN + zP) 
qzP( + 1) = xN + xP + (1 - qzP())(zN + zP) 
We assume that behavioural dynamics occur on a very fast time-scale relative to 
evolutionary dynamics, and therefore the above recurrence relations will equilibrate very 
quickly to give the equilibrium punishment scores for each state, which are: 
qxP* = (1 - yN - yP)/(1 + zN + zP) 
qyP* = (1 - yN - yP)/(1 + zN + zP) 
qzP* = (1 - yN - yP)/(1 + zN + zP) 
Since each punishment score is identical (as it merely depends on the relative frequency 
of Defectors and Discriminators in the population), we will write qxP* = qyP* = qzP* = q*. 
We assume that cooperation imposes a cost c on an actor, and confers a benefit b on a 
receiver. Punishment imposes a cost s on the punisher, whilst inflicting a cost e on the 
individual being punished. The pay-off of each of the six strategies is denoted by gij 
(given in the appendix).
 
The fitness of a given strategy is given by wij  gij /g, where g  is 
the average pay-off in the population, such that  
g  xN gxN  xP gxP  yN gyN  yPgyP  zN gzP  zP gzP  
The dynamics of a given strategy are therefore given by kij(t + 1)=kij(t)wij, where kij is the 
frequency of the strategy in question. Table 1 shows a list of the symbols used in our 
model. 
We analyse the condition under which punishing Discriminators (with a 
frequency zP) cannot be invaded by any other strategy, and is therefore an evolutionarily 
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stable strategy (ESS). The condition under which punishing Discriminators, zP, will be an 
ESS with respect to non-punishing Defectors (i.e. xN0 and zP1) is if zP have a greater 
payoff than xN (i.e. gzP > gxN), which is fulfilled if 
b - c > s - e, 
under which they are also an ESS with respect to non-punishing Cooperators (i.e. when 
yN0 and zP1). This condition is always respected since b > c and e > s. Punishing 
Discriminators will also be an ESS with respect to punishing Defectors (i.e. xP0 and 
zP1) if being punished is less costly than helping (e > c), and to non-punishing 
Discriminators (i.e. zN0 and zP1) if the benefit of helping is greater than the cost of 
punishing (b > s). If the cost of helping is greater than the cost of being punished (c > e), 
punishing Cooperators will be able to invade, and if this condition is held, punishing 
Cooperators are an ESS with respect to all strategies (except non-punishing Cooperators, 
to which they are neutral). This allows for non-punishing Cooperators to invade through 
drift. If this occurs, any of the other four strategies (i.e. xN, xP, zN and zP) will be able to 
invade. However, punishment is frequency dependent, and, during an invasion of a 
population of non-punishing Cooperators, punishing Discriminators will be able to 
outcompete non-punishing Defectors (i.e. gzP > gxN), which will occur if  
zP  > s/(b - c + e), 
which is independent of the frequency of non-punishing Cooperators (yN). Thus, as 
punishing Discriminators become more common, they are increasingly favoured over 
Defectors. But how can punishment invade a population of non-punishing Defectors (xN)? 
When common, xN will be an ESS with respect to all strategies except zN, who can invade 
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through drift. Then, as soon as they are common in the population and that the benefit of 
help is greater than the cost of punishing (b > s), a single punisher can outweigh the costs 
of punishing by receiving help and zP can invade. 
 
(b) Computer simulations 
Our analytical model considers a simplified case, with large populations and a limited 
number of strategies. To test the robustness of our results and to put them into the wider 
context of cooperative strategies, we built an individual-based model. We modelled a 
population of finite size n. In each generation, pairs of players are randomly chosen to 
interact in the following manner: one player (the donor) has to decide whether to help the 
other one (the receiver) or not. Helping incurs a cost c to the donor and a benefit b to the 
receiver (where b > c). No help results in zero payoff for both individuals. After the 
donor’s decision, the receiver has the possibility to pay a cost s in order to punish the 
donor. Punishment reduces the donor’s total payoff by e (where e > s). In each 
generation, a player has on average m interactions in one of the two roles. The fitness of a 
player is given by its total number of points at the end of its m interactions. Individuals 
then leave offspring in proportion to their fitness. Mutations occur during reproduction 
and both the helping and the punishment strategies mutate independently with a 
probability µ , in which case they are replaced at random by another helping/punishment 
strategy, respectively. This potentially creates new combinations of punishment and 
helping strategies into our simulations. We used n = 500, m = 30 and µ  = 0.02 in all our 
simulations. It is well established that for a reputation system to be efficient, a relatively 
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high number of interactions per individual is required (Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Leimar 
& Hammerstein 2001; Roberts 2008), hence our choice of m = 30 interactions. As a 
consequence, we chose a sufficiently large number of individuals in the population to 
avoid direct reciprocity effects, that is, a given player meeting the same partner in 
reversed roles (i.e. probability <0.03). In the supplementary material, we show that 
decreasing the mutation probability µ  can often hinder the emergence of punishment and 
cooperation for low benefits b and low punishment ratios (s/e; figure S1).  
Our mechanism of punishment scoring is analogous to the image scoring of Nowak & 
Sigmund (1998) but applied to punitive actions: Individuals have a punishment score that 
starts at 0 and can reach -5 or +5. We implemented four different punishment/image 
scores, which we denote k1, k2, k3 and Is: 
 k1 – punishment of defection: Each time an individual punishes defection, his k1 
increases by 1 unit, whereas each time he does not punish defection, his k1 
decreases by 1 unit. 
 k2 – punishment of either defection/cooperation: Each time an individual punishes 
(defection or cooperation), his k2 increases by 1 unit, whereas each time he does 
not punish, his k2 decreases by 1 unit. 
 k3 – punishment of cooperation: Each time an individual punishes cooperation, his 
k3 increases by 1 unit, whereas each time he does not punish cooperation, his k3 
decreases by 1 unit. 
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 Is – cooperation: Each time an individual cooperates, his Is increases by 1 unit, 
whereas each time he does not cooperate, his Is decreases by 1 unit (i.e. image 
score). 
These punishment scores are used to define the different strategies. Table 2 shows our 10 
different helping strategies specifying how a player acts in the donor role, and Table 3 
shows the 4 different punishment strategies specifying how a player acts in the receiver 
role. In summary, we have 10 different helping strategies that could be combined with 4 
different punishing strategies, i.e. there were in total 40 behavioural strategies possible. 
Figure 1 gives a typical example of how punishing strategies emerged in our 
simulations and how populations arrived at a mix of cooperative strategies. The mean 
frequencies across 20 replicates and for generations 18,000-20,000 were: punishing 
Discriminators = 0.58; punishing Cooperators = 0.12, non-punishing Discriminators = 
0.06, mean rate of cooperation = 0.98, mean rate of punishment = 0.01 (standard errors 
always < 0.01). Note that low levels of punishment are sufficient to prevent defectors 
from invading (figure 1b). Punishing Discriminators (zP) consistently evolved as the 
dominant strategy in a wide range of different parameters (figure 2), provided that the 
cost of being punished was greater than the cost of cooperating (e > c) and that the cost of 
punishing was smaller than the benefit of cooperation (s < b; figure 2). Increasing the 
benefit b of cooperation also had the consequence of increasing the frequency of 
punishing Cooperators (yP) and punishing Image scorers (aP; figure 2). Although some 
drift effects were possible (e.g. non-punishing Defectors can be invaded by other non-
cooperative strategies or, punishing Cooperators can invade punishing Discriminators; 
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figure 2), variation brought by mutations maintained a certain selective pressure for 
discrimination, such that unconditional cooperators could never dominate, i.e. the cycling 
between strategies seen in the analytical model was avoided, and cooperation was more 
stable (figure 1b). Decreasing the mutation rate  made it harder for punishers to invade 
for low benefits b of cooperation (figure S1a-f), and also decreased the selection pressure 
for discrimination (figure S1d-i). 
As in other indirect reciprocity models, our punishment scoring system depends on the 
ability of a player to correctly assess the punitive reputation of others. Thus we went on 
to test whether the inclusion of errors had an impact on our results. We introduced errors 
in the perception of an individual’s score. After each interaction, the donor’s cooperation 
score Is was replaced randomly with a probability  by either Is - 1, Is + 0 or Is + 1, and 
the receiver’s punishment score ki was replaced randomly with a probability  by either ki 
- 1, ki + 0 or ki + 1. As a consequence, the number of wrong actions caused by an 
incorrect score perception was greater at the beginning of each generation and decreased 
as the game went along (e.g. if my image score is 4 and I cooperate, replacing it by 3 
instead of 5 will not result in a wrong action). This realistic assumption reflected the fact 
that more mistakes are done when players do not know their partners at the beginning of 
the interactions. As shown in the supplementary material, the inclusion of errors often 
hinders the emergence of punishment and cooperation when the benefit b of cooperation 
is low (figure S2a-c). With greater b however, punishment still emerged but increasing 
the error rate reduced the efficiency of punishing Discriminators (zP) and punishing 
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Image scorers (aP) relative to punishing Cooperators (yP) who do not use reputation for 




Punishment that serves to prevent an individual from repeating a damaging action 
towards the punisher or that serves to prevent future defection toward the punisher seems 
to be very common in humans and some animals (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995). Recent 
studies have concluded, however, that punishment may have evolved for something else 
than for promoting cooperation, because significant benefits to punishers could typically 
not be found in the context of pure cooperation games (Sigmund 2007; Dreber et al. 
2008; Ohtsuki et al. 2009; Rand et al. 2009b; Rankin et al. 2009; Tao et al. 2009; Ule et 
al. 2009; Wu et al. 2009). Third-party punishment in an indirect reciprocity setting, for 
example, rarely favours punishment (Ohtsuki et al. 2009; Ule et al. 2009). Indeed, it has 
been suggested that benefits to groups rather than to individuals could explain the 
evolution of punishment (Boyd et al. 2003), even though punishment is expected to either 
provide direct or indirect fitness benefits to the individual in order to evolve (Gardner & 
West 2004; Lehmann & Keller 2006; Lehmann et al. 2007). For example, punishment 
can be favoured by indirect reciprocity when it discourages future aggression by 
observers (Johnstone & Bshary 2004). Our models show that even if punishing defectors 
is immediately costly, it acts to discourage future refusals to help from observers to such 
a degree that the immediate costs of punishment are outweighed by the additional 
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donations it evokes over the long run. Hence, punishment evolved in our simulations 
entirely through a punitive reputation, i.e. without punishment directed towards non-
punishers (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Sigmund 2007) or the need of spatial constraints 
(Boyd et al. 2003; Brandt et al. 2003; Bowles & Gintis 2004). 
The cognitive abilities of humans may allow reputation to be used not only for 
assessing the cooperativeness of individuals within a social group, but also with regard to 
the readiness of group members to punish defectors. In our simulations, both types of 
reputation could be used, and individuals merely using the other’s reputation of being 
generous (i.e. image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund 1998)) do not fare better than punishing 
Discriminators. The latter strategy has a higher pay-off than punishing Cooperators, a 
strategy that could be interpreted as strong reciprocity (Boyd et al. 2003; Bowles & Gintis 
2004). Strong reciprocity can be evolutionarily stable when common, but when punitive 
actions are observable by others, punishing Cooperators cannot invade punishing 
Discriminators unless the cost of helping is greater than the cost of being punished (c > e, 
as shown in our analytical model above). It is likely that situations where individuals 
actions were observable, and thus formed public information, occurred during much of 
human evolutionary history (Dunbar 1996). 
In experimental public goods games, punishment is typically perceived as 
conferring benefits on a social group and being an act of cooperation in itself (Fehr & 
Gächter 2002; Barclay 2006). Indeed, humans seem to be more likely to punish if they 
are observed by others (Kurzban et al. 2007), suggesting that they care about the 
reputation effects which arise from punishing. It has been shown that refusing low offers 
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(a sort of punishment) in the ultimatum game when there are observers made the 
“punishers” more likely to receive higher offers in later interactions (Fehr & Fischbacher 
2003). Thus, it is still unknown whether the proximate incentives to cooperate more often 
with punishers would come from the fear of being punished (and thus defecting when 
there is no threat of punishment would be opportunism; Hilbe & Sigmund In press) or 
from the wish to reward punishers for their pro-social behaviour (Fehr & Gächter 2002; 
Barclay 2006). However, the latter hypothesis raises a second-order dilemma as 
rewarding punishers is also costly. 
We focused on strategies using indirect information on the punishment reputation 
of others. Strategies using their own experience of direct punishment (i.e. whether you 
punished me) compared to those using indirect information (i.e. whether you punished 
others) may perform differently depending on the number of interactions as well as the 
group size, as it is the case with direct and indirect reciprocity (Roberts 2008). Similarly, 
the weight of information attached to reputation gained from punishment of defectors and 
cooperators was the same in our model, but both types of information could be weighted 
differently (Rankin & Eggimann 2009). We also assumed no retaliation from punished 
individuals in our models. While more realistic, the option of retaliation seems to lower 
the cooperation level in public goods games (Janssen & Bushman 2008), but it is still 
unknown what would be the influence on cooperation if retaliative actions also impact 
one’s reputation.  Another assumption of our model was that all individuals have the 
same capacity to punish. This is probably unrealistic for many animals when punishment 
could be used to establish and maintain dominance relationships, in which case dominant 
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individuals would receive more cooperation (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Bshary et al. 
2008; Stamp Dawkins In press).Our model bears similarity to the model of Hilbe & 
Sigmund (In press; here after H&S) where a game was played in which reputation was 
implemented as a probability to know about the others’ behaviour and individuals had the 
option to reward co-operators. For instance, they found that punishing Discriminators 
(denoted [OC, P] in H&S) can invade a population initially constituted of non-punishing 
Defectors (denoted [ALLD, N] in H&S) if the probability to know whether the co-player 
punishes or not is greater than s(b + s), denoted  > (b + ) in H&S. Moreover, the 
possibility for receivers to reward cooperation seems to foster the evolution of 
cooperation (and then punishment) when the probability to know the co-player’s 
reputation is small (Hilbe & Sigmund In press). We included 40 different strategies in our 
simulations including the possibility to always punish, or to punish cooperation, an often 
missing feature of many models (Boyd & Richerson 1992; Brandt et al. 2003; Gardner & 
West 2004; Lehmann et al. 2007; Hilbe & Sigmund In press), and still find that punishing 
Discriminators can bring cooperation and prevent defectors from invading. 
Our study highlights the importance of reputation in driving the evolution of 
punishment. By allowing reputation to be based on either the punishment of defectors, 
cooperators, or both, we have shown that punishing defectors and always cooperating 
with punishers emerges as a dominant strategy. Our results are also robust to the other 
strategies, such as image scoring. We conclude that reputation is the key to the evolution 
of punishment, and that simple reputations games can explain the high prevalence of 
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punishment in humans. The combination of reputation and punishment acts as a strong 
mechanism promoting the evolution of cooperation. 
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Our analytical model above consists of six strategies, namely xN, xP, yN, yP, zN and zP. The 
pay-offs for these respective strategies can be written as: 
gxN = -e(xP + yP + zP) + b(yN + yP) 
gxP = -sxN + xP(-s -e) + bzNqxP + zN(1 - qxP)(-s) + bzPqxP + zP(1 - qxP)(-s) + (yP + zP)(-e) + 
b(yN + yP) 
gyN = -c + b(yN + yP) 
gyP = -c -s(xN + xP) + bzNqyP + zN(1 - qyP)(-s) + bzPqyP + zP(1 - qyP)(-s) + b(yN + yP) 
gzN = xPqxP(-c) + xP(1-qxP)(-e) + zPqzP(-c) + zP(1 - qzP)(-e) + yPqyP(-c) + yP(1 - qyP)(-e) + 
b(yN + yP) 
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gzP = -s(xN + xP) + xPqxP(-c) + xP(1 - qxP)(-e) + bzNqzP + zNqzP(-s) + zPqzP(-c) + zP(1 - 
qzP)(-e) + yPqyP(-c) + yP(1 - qyP)(-e) + bzPqzP + zP(1 - qzP)(-s) + b(yN + yP) 
 
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Table 1. List of symbols used in the analytical model. 
 
symbol definition 
xj Defectors (with j  {N, P}) 
yj Cooperators (with j  {N, P}) 
zj Discriminators (with j  {N, P}) 
iN non-punishing i (with i  {x, y, z}) 
iP punishing i (with i  {x, y, z}) 
gij payoff of strategy ij 
g  average payoff in the population 
wij fitness of strategy ij 
c cost of helping 
b benefit of receiving help 
s cost of punishing 
e cost of being punished 
q* probability that an individual punished a defection in its last encounter 
n population size1 
m number of interactions per individual1 
µ mutation rate1 
 error rate1 
ka punishment score1 (with a  {1, 2, 3}) 
Is image score1 
1only used in the simulations 
 
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Table 2. The ten strategies in the simulations that specify how a player acts in the donor 
role.  
 
strategy name strategy notation help if receiver… helping rule 
Defectors xj - never help 
Cooperators yj - always help 
Discriminators zj punished defections k1  0 
Discriminators’ z’j did not punish defections k1 < 0 
Helpers to Punishers uj punished k2  0 
Helpers to Punishers’ u’j did not punish k2 < 0 
Helpers to C-Punishers vj punished cooperative actions k3  0 
Helpers to C-Punishers’ v’j did not punish cooperative actions k3 < 0 
Image scorers aj cooperated Is  0 
Image scorers’ a’j defected Is < 0 
 
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Table 3. The four strategies in the simulations that specify how a player acts in the 
receiver role. Non-Punishers never punish. 
 
strategy name strategy notation punish if donor… 
Unconditional Punishers iA cooperated or defected 
Non-Punishers iN - 
Punishers of defection iP defected 
Punishers of cooperation iC cooperated 
 
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Figure 1. Punishment scoring leads to cooperation in computer simulations. 
(a) The six most frequent strategies (out of 40 possible ones) in a typical simulation for a 
finite population initially constituted of non-punishing Defectors (red). Non-punishing 
Discriminators (brown) appear and pave the way for punishing Discriminators (green) to 
invade and dominate all other strategies. The other frequent strategies are Defectors 
punishing cooperation (yellow), punishing Cooperators (blue) and punishing Image 
scorers (purple). (b) Frequency of cooperative moves (blue line) and punitive moves (red 
line). Parameters values are: c = 1, b = 2, s = 1, e = 4.  
 
Figure 2. Evolution of costly punishment for different parameter values. 
The average frequencies of the most successful strategies non-punishing Defectors (xN), 
punishing Cooperators (yP), punishing Discriminators (zP), punishing Image scorers (aP) 
are calculated across 20 replicates for generations 18’000-20’000 and for c = 1, different 
values of benefit b, cost to the punisher s, and cost of being punished e (standard errors 
always < 0.1). Punishing Discriminators (zP) predominate in the simulations for a large 
set of parameters. The category “others” is the sum of the remaining 36 strategies, some 
of which mainly arise through drift, for example Defectors punishing cooperation if non-
punishing Defectors (xN) are most frequent (e.g. panel d). 
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